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REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAw

RPAPL § 732(3): Appellate Division, First Department, holds
that RPAPL prohibitsroutine scheduling of inquests prior to
signing default judgments in residentialsummary
nonpayment proceedings
RPAPL section 732 contains special provisions governing
summary proceedings for the nonpayment of rent whereby judges
must render judgment for a landlord when a tenant fails to respond within five days from the date of service.' Judges may stay
the issuance of a warrant for no longer than ten days from the
date of service. 2 During the past ten years, however, Manhattan
and Brooklyn judges have routinely ordered an inquest before
signing a default judgment in order to ensure that the statutory
requirements applicable to summary nonpayment proceedings
have been satisfied.3 Recently, in Brusco v. Braun,' the Appellate
1 RPAPL § 732(3) (McKinney 1979). RPAPL § 732 provides in part:

[T]bis section shall be applicable in... a proceeding brought on the

ground that the respondent has defaulted in the payment of rent ....
3. If the respondent fails to answer within five days from the date of
service,... the judge shall render judgment in favor of the petitioner and
may stay the issuance of the warrant for a period of not to exceed ten days
from the date of service.
Id. The Uniform Rules for Trial Courts provide that RPAPL § 732 is applicable to the
New York City Civil Court. N.Y. CITY Cirv. CT. ACT § 208.42(d) (McKinney 1994).
Article 7 of the RPAPL was enacted "to afford a 'simple, expeditious and inexpensive' means" for recovering real property, thereby serving as a substitute for an action
to recover real property, which was "an expensive and dilatory proceeding which in
many instances amount[s] to a denial of justice." 2 JOSEPH RASCH, NEW YORK LANDLORD AND TENANT INCLUDING SUMIIARY PROCEEDINGS § 29:5 (3d ed. 1988) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Similarly, § 732(3) was added to the RPAPL to prevent an
unnecessary workload on judges and to diminish "chaos." Letter from Thomas F. McCoy, State Administrator, to Hon. Sol Neil Corbin, Counsel to the Governor (July 9,
1965) (Governor's Bill Jacket 1965 Chapter 910) [hereinafter Letter from McCoy].
Critics argue, however, that RPAPL § 732 violates tenants' rights. See Ken Karas,
Recognizing a Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedingsin New
York, 24 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 527, 537 n_91 (1991) (arguing that "conspicuous
place service" is inadequate notice). But see Velazquez v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 34
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1971).
2 RPAPL § 732(3).

3 See Cerisse Anderson, Use of Inquests Struck in Nonpayment Suits; Appellate
Panel Voids Widespread Practice,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Anderson,
Inquests Struck]. Approximately ten years ago, Manhattan Civil Court judges began
the practice of ordering a special inquest before signing a default judgment against a
tenant in a summary nonpayment proceeding. Id. at 4. According to Justice Jacqueline W. Silbermann, administrator of the New York City Civil Court, approximately
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Division, First Department, held that the practice of routinely
scheduling a special inquest prior to rendering a default judgment
violates section 732(3) of the RPAPL.'
In Brusco, the landlord-petitioner initiated a summary proceeding for the nonpayment of rent pursuant to section 711(2) of
the RPAPL in order to recover possession of real property plus
80% of Manhattan Civil Court judges and 50% of Brooklyn Civil Court judges routinely require a special inquest before signing a default judgment. Id. Bronx, Queens,
and Staten Island Civil Court judges have not adopted this practice. Cerisse Anderson, Judges Devise Modifications in Rent Cases; Requests for Defaults Now Require
Affidavits, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at 1-2.
In May, 1992, Manhattan established a separate inquest part (Part K) to clarify
the process. See Anderson, Inquests Struck, supra, at 1. When a tenant defaults, the
case is sent to Part K where a judicial hearing officer conducts an inquest and reports
the results to Acting Justice Charles E. Ramos, the supervisor of the Civil Court in
Manhattan. Id. Judge Ramos then decides whether to sign the judgment. Id. Since its
creation, approximately 1000 cases per month have been referred to Part K in Manhattan alone. Id. Such inquests avoid the entry of default judgments based on defective notice. See S.P.S.G., Inc. v. Collado, 113 Misc. 2d 167,448 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1982) (rejecting application for default judgment because process
server's single attempt to serve tenant was insufficient).
In 1989, the Supreme Court of New York County upheld this procedure. Park
Holding Co. v. Arber, 145 Misc. 2d 39, 545 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
In Park Holding, the petitioner-landlord initiated a summary nonpayment proceeding
against his tenant for the tenant's nonpayment of three months' rent. Id. at 40, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 1001. The petition alleged that the tenant was served two days earlier by
conspicuous place service. Id. After the tenant did not appear and answer within the
required five day period, the petitioner requested a warrant of eviction. Id. When notified that an inquest was scheduled to occur in more than two months, the petitioner
appealed for an order directing the entry of judgment for petitioner in the nonpayment proceeding on the ground that the delayed inquest violated RPAPL § 732. Id.
The New York Supreme Court, however, denied the petition. Id. at 42-43, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03. The court held that CPLR 3215(b), which governs the procedure
for the entry of default judgments, applies to summary proceedings. Id. at 42, 545
N.Y.S.2d at 1002. The court then stated that "rendering... judgment" pursuant to
RPAPL § 732(3) is a judicial process governed by CPLR 3215(b) rather than a ministerial act governed by CPLR 3215(a). Id. at 43, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. The court ruled
that CPLR 3215(b) requires the court to "do more than merely transfer the ministerial
act of signing the judgment from the clerk to itself." Id. Finally, the court observed
that if the legislature truly intended final judgments of possession to be signed without inquest, the statute would have stipulated "that such judgments could be granted
and entered by the clerk and that application to a judge for the rendering of a judgment was not necessary." Id. Nevertheless, the court agreed that an inquest delayed
for two months was too long and directed the Clerk of the Civil Court to schedule the
inquest two weeks earlier. ParkHolding, 145 Misc. 2d at 44-45, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 100304.
4 199 A.D.2d 27, 605 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep't 1993), aff'd 84 N.Y.2d 674, 645
N.E.2d 724, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1994).
5 Id. at 27-28, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 13-14. The court ordered Civil Court Judge Richard F. Braun to sign a default judgment in a summary nonpayment proceeding without conducting a special inquest. Id.

1994]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

801

legal fees.' On March 27, after the tenant failed to answer the
petition within the five days7 required by RPAPL section 732(1),
the petitioner requested an entry ofjudgment pursuant to sections
732(3) and 747(1) of the RPAPL.8 Civil Court Judge Richard F.
Braun scheduled an inquest for May 1. 9 Judge Braun's practice
was to hold a special inquest in every application for default judgment in a residential nonpayment proceeding.' 0 The landlord-petitioner applied to the Supreme Court of New York County for
judgment without an inquest." Following the supreme court's denial of judgment
without an inquest, the landlord-petitioner
12
appealed.

The First Department rejected the supreme court's reliance
on ParkHolding Co. v. Arber,'3 which stated that mandamus does
not lie for the discretionary act of scheduling an inquest prior to
the rendering of a default judgment.' 4 The court held that RPAPL
section 732(3) requires the entry of judgment for the petitioner
6 Id. at 28, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14. RPAPL § 711 provides in pertinent part:

A tenant shall include an occupant of one or more rooms in a rooming
house or a resident, not including a transient occupant, of one or more rooms
in a hotel who has been in possession for thirty consecutive days or longer;
he shall not be removed from possession except in a special proceeding. A
special proceeding may be maintained under this article upon the following
grounds:...
2. The tenant has defaulted in the payment of rent... and a demand of
the rent has been made, or at least three days' notice in writing requiring, in
the alternative, the payment of the rent, or the possession of the premises,
has been served upon him as prescribed in section 735.
RPAPL § 711 (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1995).
The tenant lived in a ten unit brownstone at 115 West 74th Street in New York
City. Anderson, Inquests Struck, supra note 3, at 1. The petition was for the nonpayment of four months' rent. Id.
7 According to the attorney's affidavit of service, the attorney personally served
the tenant with the petition and notice of petition at 8:00 p.m. on March 16. Id.
8 Id. RPAPL § 747(1) provides in part that "[t]he court shall direct that a final
judgment be entered determining the rights of the parties." RPAPL § 747(1) (McKinney 1979).
9 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 28, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
10 Id. at 28-29, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing frequency in which civil court judges schedule special inquests before signing
default judgments in summary nonpayment proceedings).
11 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 28, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
12Id.
13 Park Holding Co. v. Alber, 145 Misc. 2d 39, 545 N.Y.S. 2d 1000 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1989).
14 Brusco, 199 ALD.2d at 29, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
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upon the default of a tenant.' 5 Discretion is only permitted in determining whether to grant "a stay in issuance of the warrant of
eviction for up to ten days." 6 The court stated that "RPAPL 732
that a summary proconstitutes an exception to the general rule
7
ceeding shall be decided at a hearing."1
Additionally, the court rejected Park Holding's conclusion
that "the term 'render' [in RPAPL section 732(3)] denotes 'not a
mere ministerial act' but 'a judicial process which should be performed in accordance with CPLR 3215(b).'"18 The First Depart15 Id. at 29, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citing N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAW § 177 (McKinney
1971)).
16 Id. (citing RPAPL § 749(3) (McKinney 1979) and J.A.R. Management Corp. v.
Foster, 109 Misc. 2d 693, 694, 442 N.Y.S.2d 723,724 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1980)).
17 Id. at 29-30, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (holding that RPAPL § 732 permits hearing
only if tenant responds to petition). Two residential summary eviction proceedings
exist in New York: (1) the holdover proceeding pursuant to RPAPL § 711(1) or RPAPL
§ 713; and (2) the nonpayment proceeding pursuant to RPAPL § 711(2). Park Holding, 145 Misc. 2d at 41, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. RPAPL § 731(2) governs the procedure for holdover proceedings. Id. at 41, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (citing RPAPL § 731(2)
(McKinney 1979)). Since RPAPL § 731(2) requires that "the notice of petition shall
specify the time and place of the hearing on the petition," holdover proceedings are
always placed on the calendar whether or not the tenant answers. Id. (quoting
RPAPL § 731(2) (McKinney 1979)). If the tenant fails to respond, the case is scheduled "for an inquest at which the petitioner must establish a prima facie case to obtain a default judgment." Id.
Nonpayment proceedings are governed by RPAPL § 732. Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at
29-30, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 14-15. According to RPAPL § 732(1) and (2), a nonpayment
proceeding is only placed on the calendar "in the event that the tenant answers 'before
the clerk.' "Id. (quoting RPAPL § 732(1), (2) (McKinney 1979)). Since RPAPL § 732(3)
requires that judgment be entered for the petitioner if the tenant fails to respond
within five days, a hearing is only scheduled if the tenant responds. Id. at 30, 605
N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citing RPAPL § 732(3) (McKinney 1979)). The Brusco court noted that
if the Park Holding rationale were correct, then summary nonpayment proceedings
would be no different than other summary proceedings to recover real property, thus
rendering RPAPL § 732(3) unnecessary. Id. (citing Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d
391, 396, 442 N.E.2d 1231, 1234, 456 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1982) and N.Y. REAL PRop.
LAw § 98(a) (McKinney 1971)).
18 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citing Park Holding v. Alber, 145
Misc. 2d 39, 43, 545 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989)). Park Holding
ruled that because CPLR 3215 governs default judgments, when dealing with summary proceedings for the recovery of real property, both CPLR 3215 and RPAPL § 732
must "be interpreted together and in a manner in which they are consistent." Park
Holding, 145 Misc. 2d at 43, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
CPLR 3215 provides in part:
(a) Default and entry. When a defendant has failed to appear, plead
or proceed to trial of an action reached and called for trial,... the plaintiff
may seek a default judgment against him. If the plaintiff's claim is for a
sum certain .... application may be made to the clerk... [who] shall enter
judgment for the amount demanded in the complaint or stated in the notice
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ment ruled that summary nonpayment proceedings are governed
solely by section 732(3) of the RPAPL, and thus, CPLR 3215 is not
applicable.' 9 The court cited the general maxim that the provi.... Where the case is not one in which the clerk can enter judgment, the
plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment....
(b) Procedure before court. The court, with or without a jury, may
make an assessment or take an account or proof, or may direct a reference.
When a reference is directed, the court may direct that the report be returned to it for further action or, except where otherwise prescribed by law,
that judgment be entered by the clerk in accordance with the report without
any further application.
CPLR 3215(a), (b) (McKinney 1992). Park Holding concluded that because "RPAPL
§ 732(3) requires the Judge to render a judgment, not merely enter one," to render
judgment must not be "a mere ministerial act which can be performed by a clerk."
Park Holding, 145 Misc. 2d at 43, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. As a result, the court held
that rendering judgment is a judicial process governed by CPLR 3215(b), not CPLR
3215(a). Id.
The Brusco court dismissed distinctions between the terms "render" and "grant"
as "purely semantic" and noted that the terms are actually synonyms for the purpose
of entering ofjudgment. Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 30, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 15 (citing BRLAN A.
GARNER,

A DICTIONARY

OF MODERN LEGAL UsAGE

474 (1987)). The Brusco court rea-

soned that RPAPL § 732(3) requires that "the judge shall render judgment" not because the rendering ofjudgment is discretionary, but rather because the provision in
RPAPL § 732(3) permitting the judge to "stay the issuance of the warrant for a period
of not to exceed ten days from the date of service" is discretionary. Id. Thus, the provision permitting the stay of issuance of the warrant is the only part of the statute that
is not "within the authority of the clerk." Id.
19 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 31, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 16. The court noted that § 1402 of
the New York City Civil Court Act, which governs the entry of default judgments,
refers only to CPLR 3215, not RPAPL § 732. Id. Thus, "[aipplying the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"the court reasoned that the omission indicates that the
RPAPL is governed by neither the New York City Civil Court Act nor the CPLR. Id.
(citing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 240 (McKinney 1971)).
Since CPLR 3215 does not apply to proceedings governed by the RPAPL, the
court further rejected the ruling in ParkHoldingthat CPLR 3215(e) does not permit a
default judgment based on the pleadings verified by an attorney without personal
knowledge of the facts. Id. at 30-31, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16 (citing ParkHolding, 145
Misc. 2d at 44, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. The court stated that the procedures governing
motions for summary judgment apply to special proceedings and that summary proceedings to recover possession of real property are special proceedings. Id. at 31-32,
605 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (citing In re Port of N.Y. Auth., 18 N.Y.2d 250, 255, 219 N.E.2d
797, 799, 273 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1966), cert. denied sub nom. McInnes v. Port of N.Y.
Auth., 385 U.S. 1006 (1967)).
Nonetheless, the court agreed with the result in ParkHolding, but for a different
reason. Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 32, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 16. Although RPAPL § 741 permits
the landlord's attorney to verify the petition, the affidavit of counsel must be "accompanied by documentary evidence ... from someone in the position of landlord or managing agent, attesting to the amount of rent currently due and owing." Id. (citing
Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 563, 404 N.E.2d 718, 720-21, 427
N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (1980)); Hasbrouck v. City of Gloversville, 102 A.D.2d 905, 905, 477
N.Y.S.2d 486, 487 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 916,472 N.E.2d 1042, 483 N.Y.S.2d 214
(1984); Farragut Gardens No. 5, Inc. v. Milrot, 23 A.D.2d 889, 260 N.Y.S.2d 597 (2d
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sions of a directory statute can be disregarded only with justification in extreme circumstances, particularly when a statute affects
public interests or individual rights.2 ° In Brusco, however, the
provided no justification for disregarding the
lower court
21
statute.
Finally, the First Department stated that because the RPAPL
provides many safeguards to ensure that a tenant is notified prior
to being evicted, and because the Housing Part has broad equitable powers to vacate a final judgment of eviction, a special inquest
prior to default judgment is unnecessary. 22 In light of these safeDep't 1965); cf. Zirinsky v. Violet Mills, 152 Misc. 2d 538, 540-41,578 N.Y.S.2d 88, 9091 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1991) (holding that RPAPL § 741 allows verification
of petition by landlord's attorney without explanation as to why petitioner did not
verify petition). Because of the high frequency with which summary proceedings are
settled, the First Department ruled that such an affidavit must be submitted at the
time a request for default judgment is made. Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 32, 605 N.Y.S.2d
at 16-17 (citing Park Holding, 145 Misc. 2d at 42, n.1, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1002, n.1).
Therefore, solely because the petition was not verified by the landlord, the court sustained the result in ParkHolding.Id. at 32, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (citing Park Holding,
145 Misc. 2d at 44, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1000)).
20 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 32, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw
§ 177(a) (McKinney 1971)). The court noted that the disregard of RPAPL § 732(3)
clearly affects the petitioner's individual rights. Id. Furthermore, such disregard affects the public interest in consistency of treatment for similar cases in different
courts. Id. at 33, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (quoting Central Park Gardens v. Ramos, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 9, 1984, at 12 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984)). The First Department
quoted CPLR 409(a) in noting that "[a] court may depart from the mandate of RPAPL
732(3) and 'require the submission of additional proof'.., when confronted with such
circumstances as a patent insufficiency in the pleadings and accompanying affidavits
or a pattern suggesting fraud in service of process." Id. (quoting CPLR 409(a) (McKinney 1990)).
21

Id.

Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 34-35, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18. The court cited the Uniform
Rules for Trial Courts § 208.42(i), known as the "postcard rule," which requires the
clerk of the court to mail notification to tenants of pending proceedings against them
in both Spanish and English. Id. at 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing [1986] 22
N.Y.C.R.R. § 208.42(i)). Furthermore, landlords are required to make a demand for
rent at least three days prior to initiating a summary nonpayment proceeding. Id.
(referring to RPAPL § 711(2) (McKinney 1979)). Finally, tenants must be notified 72
hours prior to eviction. Id. (referring to RPAPL § 749(2) (McKinney 1979)). These
safeguards ensure that tenants are notified prior to eviction. Id.
In addition, the court noted that final judgments of possession can be vacated
pursuant to CPLR 5015 if the tenant procures an order to show cause by "establishing
'underlying merit and a reasonable excuse for the default.'" Id. (citing New York City
Hous. Auth. v. Torres, 61 A.D.2d 681, 683, 403 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1st Dep't 1978)).
CPLR 5015 provides in part:
(a) On motion. The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:
22
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guards, the court ruled that an additional stage of review is both
unnecessary and contrary to the purpose of Article 7 of the
RPAPL, which was enacted to increase the speed and reduce the
expense of actions to recover real property.23
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ellerin argued that because
mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of a discretionary act, the appellate division could not compel the respondent
judge to sign a default judgment without ordering a special inquest.24 Justice Ellerin claimed that the language "render judgment" in section 732(3) of the RPAPL indicated the legislature's
intent that the judge do more than merely perform a ministerial
act which could be performed by a clerk.25
The legislative history to section 732(3) indicates that the
Brusco court was correct in concluding that "render[ing] judgment" pursuant to RPAPL section 732(3) was intended to be a
ministerial act, prohibiting the routine scheduling of an inquest
prior to signing a default judgment and permitting an order of
1. excusable default, if such motion is made within one year after service of a copy of the judgment or order with written notice of its entry upon
the moving party, or, if the moving party has entered the judgment or order,
within one year after such entry; ....
(b) On stipulation. The clerk of the court may vacate a default judgment entered pursuant to section 3215 upon the filing with him of a stipulation of consent to such vacatur by the parties personally or by their
attorneys.
c) On application of an administrative judge. An administrative
judge, upon a showing that default judgments were obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, illegality, unconscionability, lack of due service, violations of
law, or other illegalities or where such default judgments were obtained in
cases in which those defendants would be uniformly entitled to interpose a
defense predicated upon but not limited to the foregoing defenses ....
CPLR 5015 (McKinney 1992).
The First Department further noted that courts have, in certain circumstances,
reinstated tenants even after a warrant of eviction was executed. Brusco, 199 A.D.2d
at 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing Solack Estates, Inc. v. Goodman, 78 A.D.2d 512, 432
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1980); Central Brooklyn Urban Dev. Corp. v. Copeland, 122
Misc. 2d 726, 471 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1984)).
23 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 34-35, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing Lynde v. Noble, 20
Johns. 80, 82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822)); see supra note 1 (discussing purpose of Article 7 of
RPAPL).
24 Id. at 35-36, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (quoting Donaldson v.
State, 156 A.D.2d 290, 293, 548 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (1st Dep't 1989), appeal dismissed
in part, denied in part, 75 N.Y.2d 1003, 556 N.E.2d 1115, 557 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1990)).
25 Id. at 35, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 19 (Ellerin, J., dissenting). Justice Ellerin noted
"that 'to render judgment' is a judicial act, while 'to enter judgment' is a ministerial
one." Id. (quoting Evarts v. Kiehl, 102 N.Y. 296, 6 N.E. 592 (1886)).
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mandamus. 26 Furthermore, a review of the legislative intent behind CPLR 3215 indicates that the Brusco holding is consistent
with that statute.2 7 Finally, it is submitted that the policy considerations of summary proceedings for the recovery of real property
support such a ruling, but such policies would be better accomplished if the statute were amended to permit a court discretion to
stay the issuance of a warrant for a period longer than ten days.28
In a memorandum, the Joint Legislative Committee on Court
Reorganization ("JLCCR") noted that prior to the enactment of
RPAPL section 732(3) courts typically deferred entry of the judgment for several days (normally eleven) and then issued the judgment and warrant simultaneously. 29 The JLCCR objected to section 732(3) of the RPAPL because the provisions for judgment in
five days and a stay of five days would have required a two-step
process whenever a court wished to stay the issuance of a warrant
beyond the five days in which the judgment was to be rendered. 0
Legislative intent to restrict a court's discretion in staying a warrant for up to ten days is further evidenced by the fact that criticism of the statute focused on this limitation rather than the re26 See infra notes 29-31, 39 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history
of § 732(3) of the RPAPL).
27 See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing legislative purpose
behind CPLR 3215).
28 See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
29 Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization regarding Senate Intro. 4714 (Governor's Bill Jacket 1965 Chapter 910) [hereinafter Memo
4714]. This memorandum was submitted along with a Memorandum of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization regarding Senate Intro. 4536 (Governor's
Bill Jacket 1965 Chapter 910), reprinted in [1965] N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 162 [hereinafter
Memo 4536]. Memo 4714 recommended a bill, Senate Intro. 4714, which would have
amended RPAPL § 732, but was never reported out. Memo 4536, supra.
30 Memo 4714, supra note 29. Fearing that RPAPL § 732(3) as enacted would unduly "reduce the court's margin of flexibility," the Joint Legislative Committee on
Court Reorganization ("JLCCR") unsuccessfully recommended that RPAPL § 732(3)
be amended to "preserve such flexible powers in the court. .. ." Id.; see also Letter
from Daniel M. Kelly, Chairman, State of New York Assembly Taxation Committee,
to Hon. Sol Neil Corbin, Counsel to the Governor (July 13, 1965) (Governor's Bill
Jacket 1965 Chapter 910) [hereinafter Letter from Kelly]. Because the proposed
amendments to RPAPL § 732 were not reported for a vote, Assemblyman Kelly recommended that RPAPL § 732(3) be vetoed. Id. Assemblyman Kelly reiterated the argument of the JLCCR that RPAPL § 732(3) would restrict "the discretion of a Justice of
the Civil Court with respect to the length of the stay .... "Id. Although Assemblyman
Kelly noted that the stay to be permitted by RPAPL § 732(3) was the same length as
stays granted prior to enactment of the statute, he argued that justices do occasionally grant stays for periods greater than those referred to in the statute. Id.

1994]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

quirement that judgment be rendered within five days of
default.31
Contrary to the conclusion reached in Park Holding,3 2 a review of the purpose of CPLR 3215(b) indicates that the practice of
routinely holding an inquest prior to rendering a default judgment
in a summary nonpayment proceeding is not permitted if performed after ten days from the date of service. Although CPLR
3215(b) permits the court to make an assessment for the purpose
of determining the sum of the plaintiff's claim, it does not sanction
the ordering of an inquest solely to ensure compliance with the
statute. 3 Since the statute sets an outer limit of ten days from
the date of service in which the warrant must be executed, judgment by definition must be rendered prior to the issuance of the
warrant, and a procedure of scheduling an inquest greater than
ten days from the date of service violates RPAPL section 732(3). 4
Thus, even if an inquest is deemed necessary to determine
whether the statutory requirements have been met, this inquest
must be scheduled prior to ten days from the date of service.
31 See supra notes 29-30, infra note 38 and accompanying text (reviewing criticisms of RPAPL § 732(3)).
32 145 Misc. 2d 39, 44, 545 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1003 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
Park Holding held that CPLR 3215(b) permits a court to make an assessment before
rendering a default judgment; therefore when RPAPL § 732(3) is applied with CPLR
3215(b), the court is permitted to hold an inquest in a summary nonpayment proceeding prior to rendering a default judgment. Id. at 42-43, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 1002-03 (citing CPLR 3215 (McKinney 1992) and RPAPL § 732(3) (McKinney 1979)).
33 CPLR 3215(b) (McKinney 1992). CPLR 3215(a) and (b) establish the procedure
for rendering default judgment. CPLR 3215(a), (b) (McKinney 1992). CPLR 3215(a)
governs the entry of default judgment for claims in which the amount is readily ascertainable. CPLR 3215(a) (McKinney 1992). CPLR 3215(a) provides that "[i]f the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, application may be made to the clerk within one year after the default." CPLR
3215(a) (McKinney 1992) (emphasis added). If, however, "the case is not one in which
the clerk can enter judgment, the plaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment." Id.
CPLR 3215(b) governs the process for entering default judgment by the court
when the amount of the claim is not readily ascertainable. See CPLR 3215(b) (McKinney 1992). The commentaries to CPLR 3215(b) state that when a claim is not clear on
its face, the court may determine the damages itself or direct a jury or referee to
assess such damages. CPLR 3215(b) commentary at 549 (McKinney 1992).
34 RPAPL § 732(3) (McKinney 1979). RPAPL § 732(3) states that "[i]f the respondent fails to answer within five days from the date of service... the judge shall render
judgment in favor of the petitioner and may stay the issuance of the warrant for a
period of not to exceed ten days from the date of service." Id. (emphasis added). Thus,
one could argue that the statute does not place an outer time limit within which judgment must be rendered, but rather precludes the judge from rendering judgment until
a tenant has failed to respond for at least five days from the date of service.
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Finally, the policy considerations surrounding default judgments entered in summary nonpayment proceedings reveal that
the statute would better accommodate the competing interests if it
were amended to provide judges a longer period of discretion in
which to stay the issuance of the warrant. Section 732(3) of the
RPAPL was enacted primarily to ease the burden on the court's
limited judicial resources, caused by the large number of summary
proceedings to recover realty. 35 Thus, as the Brusco court noted,
the creation of another level of judicial scrutiny in the default
judgment process would counteract the intended effects of the
statute.36 At the same time, the special inquest's purpose of ensuring that tenants receive proper notification is effectuated
through the statutory safeguards, affidavit requirement, and vacatur of default judgments upon an order to show cause.3 7 It is

submitted, however, that extending the discretionary period during which judges may stay issuance of the warrant would better
protect those tenants who receive defective or no notification prior
to issuance of the warrant because they would then have greater
time to procure an order to show cause.3 Such an amendment
35 See Letter from McCoy, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that all 300,000 summary

proceedings processed in New York City Civil Court each year could not be handled if
judges were forced to process default cases). State Administrator McCoy further noted
that RPAPL § 732(3) was enacted so court clerks would be permitted to process summary nonpayment proceedings, thus improving calendar control. Id.; see also Memorandum from Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, to the Governor 3 (June 30, 1965)
(Governor's Bill Jacket 1965 Chapter 910) (noting RPAPL § 732(3) was designed to
facilitate processing of summary nonpayment proceedings in courts which handle
large number of cases each year); Memo 4536, supra note 29.
36 Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27, 34-35, 605 N.Y.S.2d 13, 18 (1st Dep't 1993),
aff'd, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 645 N.E.2d 724, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1994).
37 See id. at 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing various statutory safeguards, including
three-day demand for rent, postcard notice, 72-hour notice of eviction, and vacatur of
default judgment upon order to show cause). An additional safeguard, as noted by the
Brusco court, is "the submission of 'additional proof' in the form of an affidavit from
someone in the position of landlord or managing agent, attesting to the amount of
rent currently due and owing" at the time default judgment is requested. Id at 32,
605 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17 (quoting CPLR 409(a) (McKinney 1990)); see also supra note 22
and accompanying text (reviewing various safeguards designed to ensure tenants receive notification prior to eviction).
38 Cf Memo 4714, supra note 29 (arguing that RPAPL § 732(3) as enacted would
hamper judges' discretion to grant stay of issuance of warrant which is usually 11
days); Letter from Kelly, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that judges occasionally stay
issuance of warrants in excess of 10 day period mandated by RPAPL § 732(3)). Expressing concern that some judges could construe RPAPL § 732(3) as precluding vacatur of a default judgment, Assemblyman Kelly noted that because the notification of
service indicates that issuance of the warrant can only be stayed for 10 days as per
RPAPL § 732(3), after reading the notification of service, tenants away from home for
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would not require any additional use of precious judicial resources
except in those truly meritorious cases in which a tenant receives
defective or no notification and seeks to vacate the default judgment.3 9 Although courts already have the power to reinstate tenants even after eviction, 40 if the legislature extended the discretionary period during which the warrant may be stayed, tenants
would be spared the hardships associated with eviction.
Scott R. Saks
Editor's note: Before this issue went to print, the New York Court
of Appeals in Brusco v. Braun, 84 N.Y.2d 674, 621 N.Y.S.2d 291
(1994), affirmed the First Department'sholding. The court of appeals held that CPLR 3215(b), which permits an assessmentprior
to rendering a default judgment, does not apply because RPAPL
732(3) superseded the statute in the area of summary proceedings
for the recovery of realproperty. Id. at 681, 621 N.YS.2d at 29394. The court cited the notificationrequirementsfound in Article 7
and the civil court's equitablepower to vacate eviction warrantsas
further safeguards of tenants' rights. Id. at 681-82, 621 N.Y.S.2d
at 294. Judge Ciparick dissented, arguing that "to renderjudgment" as used in RPAPL 732(3) is a judicial act and not ministerial, and as such RPAPL 732(3) should be read consistently with
CPLR 3215(b). Id. at 682-84, 621 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95 (Ciparick,J.,
dissenting).
more than five days might be unaware that a judge "could in a proper case open the
default" judgment. Id. It is submitted that increasing the court's discretion to stay
issuance of the warrant might protect those tenants who are away from home during
the short 10 day period in which the warrant may be stayed pursuant to § 732(3) of
the present RPAPL.
39 See Letter from McCoy, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that proposed RPAPL
§ 732(3) would require judicial involvement only if tenant appeared or requested vacatur of default judgment, rather than in all motions for default judgment). Extending
the court's discretion to stay the issuance of a warrant would not require the added
cost and time associated with ordering a special inquest in every summary nonpayment proceeding prior to rendering a default judgment. Id. Rather, such an amendment would continue the present practice under RPAPL § 732(3) in which the burden
rests on the tenant to initiate a show cause order in those meritorious cases where
notification was defective. Id.
State Administrator McCoy noted that a tenant can obtain a show cause order to
stay the marshal from eviction. Id. Once the tenant does obtain a show cause order,
"the judge, upon testimony by or in behalf of the tenant manifesting any reasonable
ground, such as defective service of the papers... can stay all further proceedings.
That stay is in effect a dismissal of the proceedings." Id.
40 Brusco, 199 A.D.2d at 34, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (citing Solack Estates v. Goodman, 78 A.D.2d 512, 432 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1st Dep't 1980); Central Brooklyn Urban Dev.
Corp v. Copeland, 122 Misc. 2d 726, 471 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Kings County
1984).

